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OPINION OF THE COURT

SAROKIN, Circuit Judge:
Applicants for social security disability payments, most of
whom are truly ill or disabled, are entitled to be treated with
respect and dignity no matter what the merits of their respective
claims.

This is especially so at a time they are most vulnerable

when representing themselves or being represented by lay-persons.
Notwithstanding and recognizing the time pressures imposed upon
those

hearing

the

huge

volume

of

such

claims,

impatience, or outright bias cannot be tolerated.

rudeness,

We hold that

claimant in the instant case did not receive the full and fair
hearing to which he was entitled.

Accordingly, we remand the

case for a new hearing before another administrative law judge.

I.

Stephen

Ventura

("claimant")

applied

for

disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 401-433 (West 1991), alleging disability because of
back injuries.

The state agency handling claimant's application

denied his claim initially and upon reconsideration.

Claimant

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
The ALJ issued a decision finding claimant able to work.

The

Appeals Council, however, vacated the decision of the ALJ and
remanded the case for a new hearing because the ALJ had taken the
testimony of a medical expert and a vocational expert outside the
presence of claimant.

After holding a new hearing, the ALJ found

that although the medical evidence established that claimant had
musculoskeletal

difficulty

with

situational

anxiety

and

depression, the evidence did not demonstrate that claimant had
either a physical or mental impairment which would prevent him
from

performing

expert.

the

light

work

identified

by

the

vocational

The Appeals Council denied claimant's request for review

of the ALJ's decision.
Secretary's

final

Claimant sought judicial review of the

administrative

decision

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 1991).

in

district

court

The district court

granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.

Claimant

filed

a

timely

notice

of

appeal,

and

we

have

jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 1993).

II.

Congress provided for judicial review of the Secretary's
decisions adverse to a claimant for social security benefits.
U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West 1991).

42

"'Our standard of review, as was

the district court's, is whether the Secretary's decision is
supported by substantial evidence in the record.'"

Adorno v.

Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Allen v. Bowen,
881 F.2d 37, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)).
than a mere scintilla.
reasonable

mind

might

Substantial evidence is "more

It means such relevant evidence as a
accept

as

adequate."

Richardson

v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

However, it is the

conduct of the hearing, not the content of the evidence, which is
the subject of our focus here.
In the instant appeal, claimant contends that he did not
receive a full and fair hearing because of the ALJ's bias or
prejudice.
held

that

In Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1984), we
the

administrative

regulation

providing

for

disqualification of administrative law judges contemplates that
judicial review of bias claims take place in review proceedings
under § 405(g).

736 F.2d at 94.

Therefore, we will consider

claimant's bias claim, and, for reasons to be discussed, remand
the case for a new hearing.

In light of our decision to grant a

new hearing, we need not address the question of whether the
Secretary's decision on the merits of the disability claim is
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
F.2d

at

95

supported

by

(holding

that

although

substantial

evidence

See Hummel, 736

Secretary's
in

record,

decision

was

claimant

was

entitled to have evidence evaluated by unbiased adjudicator).

III.

The

Social

Security

Act

gives

those

claiming

disability

benefits a right to a hearing in which witnesses may testify and
evidence may be received.
1991).

The

hearing

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(b)(1) (West

should

be

"understandable

to

the

layman

claimant, should not necessarily be stiff and comfortable only
for the trained attorney, and should be liberal and not strict in
tone and operation."

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400-01.

Although

the hearing is informal in nature, due process requires that any
hearing afforded claimant be full and fair.
Additionally,

the

Social

Security

Act

and

Id. at 401-02.
its

corresponding

See Hess v. Secretary

regulations provide for fair procedures.

of Health, Education and Welfare, 497 F.2d 837, 840-841 (3d Cir.
1974); Rosa v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 782, 783 (D.N.J. 1988).
Essential to a fair hearing is the right to an unbiased
judge.
an

Hummel, 736 F.2d at 93.

impartial

decisionmaker

is

The due process requirement of
applied

more

strictly

in

administrative proceedings than in court proceedings because of
the

absence

of

procedural

safeguards

normally

available

in

judicial

proceedings.

Id.

at

93.

With

respect

to

the

disqualification of an ALJ, the Secretary has enacted regulations
which provide that:
An administrative law judge shall not conduct a hearing
if he or she is prejudiced or partial with respect to
any party or has any interest in the matter pending for
decision.
20 C.F.R. § 404.940, 416.1440 (1994).

The claimant must bring

any objections to the attention of the ALJ, and the ALJ shall
decide whether to continue the hearing or withdraw.
regulations

provide

that

if

the

ALJ

does

not

Id.

withdraw,

The
the

claimant may present objections to the Appeals Council as reasons
why the hearing decision should be revised or a new hearing held
before another ALJ.
The

right

to

Id.
an

unbiased

ALJ

is

particularly

important

because of the active role played by ALJs in social security
cases.

See Hess, 497 F.2d at 840-841.

ALJs have a duty to

develop a full and fair record in social security cases.

See

Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 934 (11th Cir. 1995); Smith v.
Harris, 644 F.2d 985, 989 (3d Cir. 1981).
must

secure

relevant

information

Accordingly, an ALJ

regarding

entitlement to social security benefits.

a

claimant's

Hess, 497 F.2d at 841.

In Hess we reasoned that "[a]lthough the burden is upon the
claimant to prove his disability, due regard for the beneficent
purposes

of

the

standard

be

used

legislation
in

this

requires

that

administrative

a

more

proceeding

tolerant
than

is

applicable in a typical suit in a court of record where the
adversary system prevails."

Id. at 840.

The

claimant

procedures

set

in

the

forth

instant
in

disqualification of ALJs.

case

the

has

abided

regulations

by

the

regarding

At the hearing held on February 23,

1994, claimant's lay representative alleged that the ALJ was
prejudiced and requested that he disqualify himself.
135.1

The ALJ refused without explanation.

Id.

Tr. at

The Appeals

Council also rejected claimant's bias charge, similarly without
explanation.

Tr. at 7.

Finally, the district court devoted one

sentence to this issue stating that: "After a careful review of
the record there is simply no evidence to support [claimant's]
allegations of bias or interference."

Ventura v. Shalala, No.

94-111-JLL, slip op. at 13 (D. Del. Sept. 13, 1994).
We too have carefully examined the record and conclude that
the ALJ's treatment of claimant and his lay representative was
unacceptable and violated claimant's right to a full and fair
hearing.

The

following

are

revealing

excerpts

from

the

transcript of the hearing.
The ALJ demonstrated early on in the hearing his impatience
and hostility towards claimant's lay representative.
ALJ: I thought you weren't going to ask leading
questions?
Representative ("Rep."):

Well, your Honor, I --

ALJ: Well what?
Rep.:

I guess I, I, I --

ALJ: I guess you did, didn't you?
another way of doing it.

Why don't you try

1 "Tr." refers to the Administrative Transcript.

Rep.:
All right, sir.
Your Honor, it's obvious my
client is in severe discomfort, and his, his ability to
concentrate and respond, sometimes he needs a little
edging.
ALJ: That's what you call a leading statement.
don't you just ask the questions.
Rep.:

Why

Do you ever have a discomfort --

ALJ: Now I think I'll address your characterization of
your client being in significant discomfort. I don't
see it's -- go ahead. And you put that on the record
to see if you could establish that on the record he was
in severe discomfort at the hearing. I don't see it.
So you see it. Go ahead. We see different things.
Tr. at 142.
The ALJ subsequently interrupted claimant's description of
his back pain in order to question claimant concerning his lack
of representation at an earlier hearing.

The following colloquy

ensued:
Claimant: There have been four days in the last six
years when I haven't had pain.
ALJ: How come you didn't tell me the truth about the
attorneys?
Claimant: I
question.

told

you

every

--

I

answered

every

ALJ: But what I asked you about the attorneys, you
didn't tell me the truth. You didn't tell me the truth
about why they didn't want her sanctioned.
Claimant: Your -- I -ALJ: Why didn't you? That's what I'm asking.
Rep.: Answer the question.
Claimant: You know, I -- you know.
ALJ: Answer my question.
Claimant: I will.

Are you the doctor?

ALJ: Now.

Answer my question, sir.

Claimant: You think I'm going to be -- truly I'm sorry,
but I'm not afraid. I'm just not afraid.
ALJ: I don't care if your afraid or not.
Answer my
question. Why didn't you tell me the truth about the
attorneys.
Tr. at 143.

The ALJ finally gave claimant a chance to respond,

and claimant simply repeated what he had told the ALJ at the last
hearing--that he had no representative because the attorney he
had

contacted

hearing.

did

not

Tr. at 144.

want

to

come

to

Philadelphia

for

the

The ALJ's questioning of the claimant was

coercive and intimidating, and totally irrelevant to the question
of whether claimant was disabled.

Moreover, the ALJ appeared

disinterested in claimant's description of his pain in violation
of

the

duty

to

"give

serious

consideration

to

a

claimant's

subjective complaints of pain, even where those complaints are
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d

not supported by objective evidence."
1058, 1067 (3d Cir. 1993).

Furthermore, it is apparent from the ALJ's comments that as
soon as an expert witness mentioned that claimant had attended a
psychiatric
concluded

clinic

that

impairment.

at

a

veterans'

claimant's

Tr. at 170.

back

hospital,

pain

was

the

caused

ALJ
by

hastily

a

mental

The ALJ then proceeded to interfere

with the admission of evidence concerning the physical causes for
claimant's

pain,

physician.

The ALJ stubbornly focused on obtaining information

from

the

veterans'

i.e.

the

hospital.

opinion

When

of

claimant's

claimant's

treating

representative

attempted

to

redirect

the

ALJ's

attention

to

the

opinion

of

claimant's treating physician, he was censured by the ALJ who
stated:
ALJ: Tell you what, if I throw him out, he has nothing.
How does that grab you?
I want to see what the VA
Center says. Obviously, they've sent it to some type
of physician or psychologist if he's had testing. It's
only going to help him.
It's not going to hurt him.
What's the matter with you?
Tr.

at

172.

The

ALJ

continued

to

intimidate

claimant's

representative:
ALJ: . . . I'm not trying to hurt Mr. Ventura, but
you're not doing one damn thing to help him.
So why
don't you sit back and listen for a second.
Tr. at 172.

The representative agreed to provide the ALJ with

whatever information he wanted from the veterans' hospital and
presented the ALJ with detailed information concerning claimant's
visits to the veterans' hospital.
ALJ

further

reprimanded

Tr. at 172-73.

claimant's

However, the

representative

when

he

attempted to question the medical expert on the stand.
ALJ: First of all, you're trying to knock out evidence
that's favorable to Mr. Ventura.
the

roses

on

this

emotional area.
Tr.

at

174.

case.

His

So wake up and smell
problem

lies

in

the

. . .

Claimant's

representative

again

attempted

to

question the expert concerning the physical causes of claimant's
back

pain

and

again

the

ALJ

reprimanded

the

representative

preventing this line of questioning.
ALJ: Why are you reading this to death when I said that
primarily if he's got this emotional condition as the
VA Center seems to think he has, it's going to be
beneficial to him?
Why are you trying to kill this

thing on the physical when it's not going to matter to
him?
Tr.

at

180.

The

ALJ's

continuous

interference

with

the

representative's introduction of evidence of the physical causes
of claimant's back pain violated the ALJ's duty to develop the
record fully and fairly and to consider seriously the findings of
a treating physician.

See Mason, 994 F.2d at 1067.

Importantly,

the representative had already provided the ALJ with information
concerning claimant's visits to the veterans' hospital and had
agreed to provide any additional information requested by the
ALJ.

IV.

We now turn to the question of whether claimant is entitled
to a new hearing because of the ALJ's conduct.

We hold that the

ALJ's offensive conduct prevented claimant from receiving a full
and fair hearing and, therefore, a new hearing must be held
before another ALJ to determine whether claimant is entitled to
disability benefits.
In
district

Hummel,
court's

Secretary.

supra,
grant

a
of

disability
summary

claimant

judgment

in

appealed

the

favor

the

of

Claimant argued that the Secretary's decision was not

supported by substantial evidence and, alternatively, that the
district court erred in ruling on the Secretary's motion for

summary judgment while her motions to compel discovery remained
outstanding.

Hummel, 736 F.2d at 92.

These discovery requests

sought information concerning the possible bias of the ALJ who
presided at claimant's hearing.

Id.

We held that although the

Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence in the
record, claimant was entitled to have the evidence evaluated by
an unbiased adjudicator.

Id. at 95.

We stressed that even if

the record was totally devoid of evidence supporting a finding of
disability, "the bias of the adjudicator might still be a ground
for setting aside a determination adverse to the claimant, for we
have repeatedly held that in Social Security disability claim
hearings

the

administrative

law

judge

has

an

affirmative

obligation to assist the claimant in developing the facts."
(citations

omitted).

Furthermore,

we

stated

that:

"It

Id.
is

difficult to conceive of how a judge biased against disability
claims or claimants could conscientiously perform that duty."
Id.
In Hummel, we reversed the district court and instructed it
to consider whether a remand to the Secretary for the taking of
new evidence on the alleged bias of the ALJ was appropriate.
F.2d at 95.
is

made

736

We noted that "[i]n the event that a finding of bias

on

remand,

a

new

hearing

must

be

held

before

an

administrative law judge to determine the merits of Hummel's
claim."

Id.

Additional

discovery

was

necessary

in

Hummel

because the alleged bias of the ALJ, which was discovered after
the

Secretary

had

entered

its

decision,

arose

from

an

extrajudicial source which required further investigation.

In

contrast, the taking of new evidence is not necessary in the
instant case because the ALJ's conduct at the hearing can be
evaluated using the hearing transcript.
The district court's decision in Rosa v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp.
782 (D.N.J. 1988), is instructive.

There, the district court

addressed the issue of whether a disability claimant was accorded
a

full

and

transcript
hearing

fair
of

"was

hearing.

the

Id.

hearing,

shameful

in

the
its

at

783.

court

Upon

found

atmosphere

reviewing

that
of

the

claimant's
alternating

indifference, personal musings, impatience and condescension."
Id.

The

district

court

emphasized

the

importance

of

fair

procedures:
This court has previously criticized this agency's
heartlessness in the repeated and unfounded rejection
of a multitude of clearly valid claims. However, even
in those cases, the unjust results followed seemingly
adequate procedures. In this matter there was not even
the pretense of a full and fair hearing.
Once we
foresake [sic] fairness and due process because of the
pressure of heavy caseloads, then our system of justice
will end.
Although administrative hearings are not
formal trials, nor should they be so informal or
limited that their fairness is destroyed.
Id. at 785.

Accordingly, the district court vacated the decision

of the Secretary and remanded the case for a full and fair
hearing.

Id.

In this case, we do the same.

V.

Because of the ALJ's offensive and unprofessional conduct,
claimant in the instant case did not receive the full and fair

hearing to which he was entitled.

We hold, therefore, that

claimant is entitled to a new hearing before another ALJ.

In

light of our disposition of this case, we need not reach the
merits of the other issues raised on appeal.

Accordingly, we

reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the Secretary and remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

